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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from entry of Final Judgment and 
Sentence filed 6 August 1993 in the Fourth Circuit Court (Spanish 
Fork Department) of Utah County, State of Utah. The Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, Rule 26, and Utah Rule of Appellant 
Procedure, Rule 3(a) and 4(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. The trial court erred in allowing prosecution of a 
vague and unenforceable city ordinance which exceeded the State 
statute in language, construction and use of words This is a 
question of law, to be reviewed for correctness, giving no 
deference to the trial courts' interpretations. 
2. The trial court erred in verdict of guilty against 
the Defendant/Appellant when the evidence marshalled forth by the 
Plaintiff was insufficient to support such a verdict. This is an 
issue of "plain error" to be reviewed for basic fairness. 
3. The bias and prejudice of the Judge towards the 
Defendant/Appellant severely hampered the Defendant/Appellant's 
right to fundamental fairness at the trial. This is a question to 
be reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial 
court's interpretations. 
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4. The Defendant/Appellant was greatly prejudiced by 
the ineffective assistance of Counsel that he received at the 
trial. This is a question to be reviewed for correctness, giving 
no deference to the trial court's interpretations. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
1. "In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence." 
United States Const. Amend. VI. 
2. "The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the 
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United States is the 
supreme law of the land." 
United States Const. Art. I, Sec. 3. 
3. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 7. 
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4. "All court shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury due to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecution or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party." 
Utah Const.. Art. I, Sec. 11. 
5. "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defendant in person and by counsel, to demand 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." 
Utah Const.. Art. I, Sec. 12. 
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6. "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 24. 
1. "Unless otherwise specifically authorized by 
statute, the governing body of each municipality may provide a 
penalty for the violation of any municipal ordinance by a fine not 
to exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine under U.C.A. Sec. 
76-3-301 (1953), or by a term of imprisonment up to six month, or 
by both the fine and term of imprisonment. The governing body may 
prescribe a minimum penalty of the violation of any municipal 
ordinance and may impose a civil penalty for the unauthorized use 
of municipal property, including, but not limited to, the use of 
parks, streets, and other public grounds or equipment. Rules of 
civil procedure shall be substantial followed." 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 10-3-703 (1953). 
8. "Questions of statutory construction are matter of 
law for courts and are subject to 'correction of error7 standard of 
review, according no deference to administrative agency's 
interpretation except in limited cases..." 
Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Tax Com'n. 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990) . 
4 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter originated in Fourth District Circuit Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah, Spanish Fork Division, the Honorable 
John C. Backlund presiding. Appellant was charged with and 
convicted for violating the Spanish Fork City nuisance ordinance. 
This case came to trial 19 July 1993 and Appellant was sentenced 6 
August 1993. All motions of the Appellant were ruled on at the end 
of trial, and all were denied, as were all post Judgment motions. 
The Court sentenced Appellant under a City Ordinance with no 
penalty clause, which is required by Utah statute and case law. 
The case is cleared in the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant was charged with violating the Spanish 
Fork City Nuisance Ordinance by keeping material on his property 
which Spanish Fork City claims violated said nuisance ordinance. 
(See Attachments.) 
2. Said Spanish Fork nuisance ordinance is vague and 
insufficient on its face and violates Utah statute by containing no 
"penalty clause" for its violation. 
3. Spanish Fork City presented no evidence at trial 
that Appellant's property was hazardous in any way, while Appellant 
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presented a letter from the Health Department to the contrary 
(Record at 33, lines 13-25, and at 34, lines 1-11.) 
4. The Judge in this case showed disdain and contempt 
for the Appellant, even calling him a "pack rat" prior to 
completion of the trial, in refusing to allow Appellant's attorney 
to present his case, stating that now matter how many witnessed he 
produced to the contrary, it was still a nuisance. This showed a 
clear bias and prevented Appellant from proper protection by the 
Judicial system. (Record at 49-52.) 
5. Appellant filed numerous motions, both before trial 
and after. All were disposed of by denial, without argument or 
discussion of any kind allowed. 
6. Appellant was fined and put on probation for his 
"crimes", under an Ordinance which validates Appellant's due 
process right by containing no penalty clause and is incomplete and 
unenforceable. 
7. Appellant's attorney, Paul Merrill, was ineffective, 
in that he know the law well, but has so many physical limitation, 
including severe hearing loss, which prevented proper defense of 
Appellant, as is apparent in the transcript and the fact that 
Appellant filed all of the motions himself, not relying on the 
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attorney. This condition is known by all judges and attorney 
familiar with Mr. Merrill. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Trial Court erred in allowing prosecution of a vague 
and unenforceable city ordinance, since it lacks required verbiage 
as mandated by Utah Law. Additionally, the Appellant's counsel was 
ineffective at providing a proper defense at trial, thus depriving 
the Appellant due process of law. 
ARGUMENTS 
The Trial Court erred in allowing prosection of a vague 
and unenforceable city ordinance. The Appellant was charged under 
Spanish Fork City Ordinance 8.24.020. This ordinance is without a 
penalty clause, which is required by Utah statute and case law, and 
should therefore be held unenforceable. Appellant's case was 
actually defended by his attorney under the first addendum herein 
enclosed with this brief (See exhibit A.) 
By such a ruling, Spanish Fork City has a remedy in that 
it can amend its ordinance. Spanish fork City already is on notice 
that said ordinance is unconstitutional, Appellant having filed 
motions on unconstitutionality, which the Court denied summarily 
without argument. (See exhibit B.) 
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Utah Code Ann. Sec. 10-8-60 (1953) states: 
"They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the 
same, and impose fines upon persons who may create, continue or 
suffer nuisance to exist." 
This is a question of law for vagueness, basically a due 
process violation. (See Utah State Const. Art. I Sec. 7.) 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-10-801 (2) (1953) states that a 
nuisance is a Class B Misdemeanor. This is a State Statute, under 
which Appellant was not charged. Spanish Fork City chose to enact 
its own nuisance ordinance, and therein failed to provide 
penalties. This makes the ordinance unenforceable. 
In Moorehouse v. Hammond, 209 P. 883, 885 (1922), the 
Court said: 
There are in this state no crimes or offenses, 
except such as are created by statute or 
ordinance, and a court is powerless to impose 
a penalty not prescribed by a statute or 
ordinance, and hence a statute or ordinance 
making it a crime or offense to do a certain 
act, without attaching a penalty to the doing 
of such an act, is inoperative, and incapable 
of being given any effect by the Courts. 
So it is shown that when an ordinance does not prescribe 
a penalty for its violation, the courts are powerless to enforce 
it. 
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This same rationale has been approved of in other cases. 
In Ex parte Ellsworth, 165 Cal 677, 133 P. 272 (1913), there was an 
ordinance in relation to intoxicating liquors. That ordinance, as 
in Moorehouse, Id., and the case at bar, failed to impose any 
penalty for its violation. The Court held the ordinance without 
force or effect. 
Likewise, in New Orleans v. Steen, 137 La. 652, 69 So. 43 
(1915), the defendant was convicted of violating an ordinance 
pertaining to the public health. An appeal was commenced because 
there was no penalty for the violation and therefor the sentence 
imposed by the court was illegal and void. The court agreed 
saying: 
There are in this State no crimes or offenses 
except such as are created by statute or 
ordinance, and a court is powerless to impose 
a penalty not prescribed by a statute or an 
ordinance, and hence a statue or ordinance 
making it a crime or offense to do a certain 
act, without attaching a penalty to the doing 
of such act, is inoperative, and incapable of 
being given any effect by the Courts. 
Again, in Cribb v. State, 9 Fla. 418, the Court said: 
"But the difficulty of sustaining the conviction and Judgment under 
this count is that, although it enjoins or forbids the resident 
form holding the license, no penalty or remedy by indictment is 
prescribed... The statutes that creates the offense has not 
provided the penalty." 
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Therefore, the court held the conviction illegal. All 
lawyers, judges, legislators and citizens must realize that, unless 
a criminal statute prescribes a penalty for its violation, the 
Courts are powerless to enforce it. 
In dealing with ordinances the court in Thrift Hardware 
& Supply Co., v. City of Phoenix, 71 Ariz. 21, 222 P.2d 994 (1950) , 
(See also 22 ALR 2d 810) , said the "average man may with due care, 
after reading the ordinance, understand whether he will incur 
penalty or not, or otherwise it is void for uncertainty." 
The Appellant is the average man. Even an attorney, 
knowing there are penalties for violation of all ordinances, would 
be at a loss to say for sure what the penalty in the Spanish Fork 
nuisance ordinance is. If an attorney cannot find it, the average 
man certainly cannot, and this ordinance should be held without 
effect. 
To sum this up, we see another Utah case where the court 
held that City Commissioners and police officers of the city were 
without power to prevent the violation of an ordinance which failed 
to fix a penalty for its violation. (See also Roe v. Lundstrum, 89 
Utah 520, 57 P.2d 1128, [1936].) 
Additionally, an ordinance attempting to regulate a 
dealer's business in second-hand goods, which prescribed no penalty 
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for its violation was held a "nullity" in so far as criminal 
proceedings are concerned. (See also City of Coffeyville v. Vakas, 
22 P.2d 428, 137 Kan. 797 [1933].) 
In un-countered testimony by the Appellant at trial, the 
Appellant testified that the was using the "junk" for art work and 
that he sold numerous articles at swap meets, etc., in Salt Lake 
County. This shows that the items were not junk, or no one would 
want to purchase them. 
Appellant was charged under Spanish Fork City Ordinance 
No. 8.24.020, which states as follows: 
Nuisance withstanding any provisions of state 
law, a nuisance is also defined to mean any 
condition or use of premises or of building 
exteriors which are deleterious or injurious, 
obnoxious or unsightly which include, but is 
not limited to keeping nor depositing on, or 
scattering over the premises; 
a. Lumber, junk, trash, or debris. 
b. Abandoned, discarded, or unused objects 
or equipment such as furniture, stoves, 
refrigerators, freezers, cans, containers, or 
other items. 
Statue construction is critical to both the governmental 
entity and the citizen. Without the ordinance being clear and 
concise, neither party is able to have the ordinance enforced to 
its satisfaction. 
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The Spanish Fork City Ordinance does not comply with the 
Utah State ordinance on nuisances. To begin with, as has already 
been argued, there is not a penalty clause to the Spanish Fork City 
Ordinance under which Appellant is charged. Additionally, the 
Spanish Fork ordinance adds portions to its ordinance, different 
from the Utah State Statute. In so doing, Spanish Fork City does 
not end up with the clear and concise ordinance necessary to be 
enforced. Appellant therefore asks that the ordinance be declared 
unconstitutional for vagueness, the exclusion of a penalty clause, 
and the absence of definitions for its terms, which make it 
impossible for the city to define its ordinance for the citizen to 
comply therewith. 
With the ordinance in effect, the Appellant and citizenry 
as a whole, wonders what they will be charged with next. Spanish 
Fork City already prosecuted Appellant previously under another 
ordinance and ran him out of business. It seems that "selective 
prosecution" is apparent as pertains to the Appellant. Appellant 
turned in his business license at the time and the case was 
settled. (See addendum.) Now he has been prosecuted to force him 
to remove materials which he used in his production of art and 
which have been on the premises for more than three years. In 
fact, Appellant has been engaged in the production of art and sale 
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of merchandise at swap meets longer than the three year statutory 
period and should be grandfathered. Appellant had many "expert" 
witnesses present to testify to the value of the materials Judge 
Backlund classified as junk and refused to hear (Record at 48-50.) 
The Spanish Fork City ordinance states that "certain 
persons accumulate various items which are unsightly and generally 
cause diminution of property values in the city..." All laws of a 
general nature must exist or they are special laws and in violation 
of State constitution. Any "average citizen" would define 
"unsightly" differently and "generally cause" is undefinable, as is 
"other items." This statute is extremely vague. This statute as 
written, gives Spanish Fork City free license to harass and 
prosecute whomever they wish. Does it mean that anyone, believing 
his or her property is devalued because of their neighbor's may 
force a neighbor to comply with their wishes? This is a standard 
unfounded in any law in a free society. 
In its police power, Spanish Fork City cannot impose 
restrictions which are arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. 
These mean willful and unreasoning action taken without 
consideration of, or in disregard of, the facts and circumstances. 
This is exactly what has occurred in Appellant's case. He has been 
arbitrarily singled out, twice, for prosecution under different 
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ordinances to force his compliance and for confiscation of his 
business and property by a city out of control. 
In Sanitation District No. 1 v. City of Louisville, 308 
Ky. 368, 213 S.W. 995, 1000 (1948), the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
said: 
"So it may be said that whatever is contrary to 
democratic ideals, customs and maxims is arbitrary. 
Likewise, whatever is essentially unjust and unequal or 
exceeds the reasonable and legitimate interest of the 
people is arbitrary." 
Additionally, the "Due Process" clause of the 14th 
Amendment, and similar provisions in the Utah Constitution, is 
intended to prohibit arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or 
property, but not limit the subjects upon which the police power of 
the state may be lawfully exerted. 
In the Appellant's case, Spanish Fork City has acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously to deprive Appellant of his liberty 
and property. In its ordinance what remedy is adopted? It simply 
is not clear! What standards guide determination of Spanish Fork 
City officials? These standards are necessary to properly put 
Appellant on notice as to what is expected of him. They simply do 
not exist in the Spanish Fork ordinance. 
In Commonwealth v. Protami, 236 N.E. 2d 649, 650 (Mass. 
1968), it states: 
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"The clearly expressed and mandatory provisions of a 
zoning statute, and this ordinance is for all intents and 
purposes a zoning ordinance, may not be abrogated, 
ignored, or relaxed to meet the real or supposed 
practical needs of the municipality or its inhabitants." 
(See also 117 ALR 1123.) 
Any zoning ordinance must be confined by the limitation 
fixed in the enabling statute, and a particular zoning ordinance or 
provision thereof may be declared void because it exceeds the power 
granted by the zoning statutory or charter provision. The 
ordinance at bar both exceeds and eliminates portions of its state 
statutory enabling provisions and is thus, unenforceable. 
In its determination of the validity of the Spanish Fork 
City ordinance, this court must determine whether the ordinance is 
arbitrary or unreasonable in its conception or application. In 
determining the question of reasonableness, the court must 
determine that the ordinance is (1) applied appropriately to the 
facts of the case; (2) that due diligence and investigation of the 
circumstances warrant the action taken; (3) that the ordinance is 
set forth with clear definitions, sufficient to inform an ordinary 
reader of common intelligence what conduct is either proscribed or 
forbidden; (4) that the ordinance does not exceed the State code in 
operation or language. If this court looks clearly at the State 
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Code and the Spanish Fork City nuisance ordinance, it must 
determine that it is beyond the reach of state law. 
We see in the case at bar that the Appellant has been 
thwarted at every turn by Spanish Fork City. First he had to give 
up his business to comply with their wishes, even though he is in 
a "commercial zone.11 Two years later, the case at bar is at issue. 
Appellant has tried to comply by requesting permits to erect 
buildings in which to store his materials, This has been 
effectively thwarted by Spanish Fork City's refusal to issue such 
permits without Appellant putting out additional monies to install 
curb and gutter in an area where he would then be the only property 
owner with curb and gutter. This is done for the direct monetary 
benefit of Spanish Fork City without regard to the rights to 
property of the Appellant. 
Appellant has become frustrated because every attempt at 
compliance is met with yet another hoop for him to jump through. 
In Jones v. Logan City Corp., 19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P.2d 
160 (1967), the court said that "an ordinance enacted pursuant to 
this statute, (i.e. Utah State Statute), but which did not define 
what was a nuisance, was invalid as an unlawful delegation of power 
to the city's board of condemnation in that quasi-judicial powers 
16 
had been conferred upon the board without standards or guidelines 
to govern the board in its determinations." 
This is exactly the problem with the Spanish Fork City 
ordinance. There is imposed a quasi-judicial power, by ordinance, 
upon Spanish Fork City without conferring the necessary standard or 
guidelines with which it may govern its determination. 
In the case at bar, the insufficiency of the evidence and 
testimony, the City should have been evident to the Court. The 
transcript of the proceeding will show that the City's witness, Mr. 
Dee Rosenbaum's answers, on both direct and cross examination were 
vague and evasive. Mr. Rosenbaum's only "probable cause" was the 
"city council's" informing him of "numerous places" that were 
"quite unsightly", and the Appellant's property was one of those 
complained of. (Record at 5.) The city's witness then testifies 
of what "appeared to be junk items about his property. . ." and that 
he had "spelled those things out the best we could in the letter." 
(Record at 8.) 
This "letter" was not written by the Health Department 
nor by any one identified as having training in purported "health 
hazards." Mr. Rosenbaum's sole testimony consisted of his malice 
toward the Appellant's lack of concern over going to court on the 
charges. (Record at 8-9, 11.) 
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Mr, Rosenbaum then states that he is concerned with the 
violation of the City's ordinance on Appellant's property because 
of rodents (Record at 13) , then impeaches his own testimony by 
stating he "did not observe any rodents." (Record at 17.) 
Mr. Rosenbaum states that he had made investigation on 
health related property inspections before "hand-in-hand with the 
Utah County Health Department." But, Rosenbaum was not concerned 
enough to instigate an inspection of Appellant's property with any 
Health Department official. (Record at 12-13.) The City failed to 
meet the burden of establishing just exactly what was "junk" and 
what was "harmful" to the health of the surrounding neighbors. 
On cross examination of Rosenbaum, the then counsel for 
the Appellant tried to establish that the very people that 
Rosenbaum "worked hand-in-hand" with did have the same opinion as 
he, the city police chief, had. (Record at 17.) When Appellant's 
counsel asked what caused Mr. Rosenbaum's concerns, he responded 
with his pet items aforementioned, that Appellant's property 
contained "ideal conditions for rodents to be in and breed in", and 
to which he had already testified that he had "seen none." 
The City is acting under the police powers of the general 
welfare clause of the State of Utah. These laws are to insure the 
"health, safety and moral s of the city as a whole. The trial 
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court disallows the cross examination of the witnesses definitions 
of safety hazards. (Record at 18.) The court then interrupts the 
Appellant's counsel on re-cross examination with impatience and 
lack of concern for the Appellant's due process right to re-cross 
examination. 
Mr. Butler's testimony is just as vague and ambiguous. 
Mr. Butler states his concern that Appellant's property is 
devaluing his property, but Butler never clearly states exactly how 
Appellant's property is devaluing his own property. His testimony 
is based on "a number of items that are scattered about..." 
Appellant's yard. The trial court refused to allow Appellant's 
counsel the right to impeach testimony on bias and prejudice 
grounds. This severely prejudiced the Appellant's defense and 
violated basic due process rights, the fright to confrontation, 
Art. I, Sec. 12, of the Utah Constitution. Mr. Butler stated that 
his complaint was mainly "devaluation" of the adjacent parcels of 
property, bus is vague as to just "how" his property was being 
devalued. (Record at 28, lines 1-8.) 
Then, without even allowing Appellant's counsel to finish 
cross examination or even to inquire if the Appellant's counsel was 
finished with the witness, the judge dismisses the witness. 
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It is clear from beginning to end that Judge Backlund had 
the Appellant already tried and convicted, and it did not matter if 
Spanish Fork City proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt or with 
a scintilla of evidence, thus the trial judge violated canons 1, 2, 
and 3 of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. 
All of the factors show that the trail court should have 
been aware of the insufficiency of the City's case. Had the Court 
protected the Appellant's rights, a far more favorable outcome 
would have resulted. (See also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 [Utah 
1993] .) 
Appellant is an artist. He is registered as an artist, 
not a "pack rat" as Judge Backlund stated at trial. Being an 
artist is a highly creative and exceptional circumstance which the 
Court did not allow to be introduced into evidence. But, neither 
did Spanish Fork City dispute that the Appellant was indeed "an 
artist." (See also Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 [Utah 1989].) 
Even though Appellant was only charged under Spanish Fork 
Ordinance No. 8.24.020, the Court tried and convicted the 
Appellant, without notice, of numerous other provisions of the 
city's nuisance ordinance. It seems incredible that Appellant 
could be convicted by a sitting Judge of the State of Utah of 
crimes he was not even charged with. In the record at 51, lines 
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17-18, Judge backlund states: "Mr. Burke, I'm going to find you 
guilty of having and maintaining a nuisance." 
Rule 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct states: 
"A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client. 
Rule 1.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct states: 
"A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a 
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness, and preparations reasonable necessary for the 
representation." 
With these rules it is apparent that the attorney is the 
"advocate" for the client. Under Rule 1.2 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, we see that an attorney "may limit" the 
objectives of his representation if the client consents after 
consultation." There appears to never have been any such 
consultation or agreement thereafter, both of which are required by 
the Rules, between the attorney and the Appellant in this case. 
Yet, Appellant filed his own motions in the case. Never once does 
the attorney's name ever appear on said motions. (See addendum.) 
The attorney for the Appellant is competent in the law, 
however, his physical limitations greatly limit his effectiveness 
in Court. This is due to his advanced age and the fact that it is 
21 
very difficult for him to hear. A thorough reading of the 
transcript will illustrate these facts. Numerous times, Mr. 
Merrill did not appear to know what was transpiring. It is 
apparent, from the transcript, that the judge was likewise aware of 
the attorney's limitations and took no steps to compensate 
therefore in order to afford Appellant reasonable and competent 
representation. 
The resulting ineffective assistance of counsel is 
blatantly obvious by the fact that Appellant did, in fact, file all 
of his own motions, the attorney not helping in this even through 
he was retained to do so. This shows that counsel's performance 
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness required of 
attorneys. (See State v. Strickland, 466 U.S. 690 [1984].) It is 
also seen that a "reasonable probability" exists that, but for 
counsels errors, the result of this proceeding would have been 
different. 
Although the court may conclude that a single error 
rendered counsel's assistance ineffective (See Murray v. Carrier, 
477 U.S. 487 [1986]), "the right to effective assistance of 
counsel.. .may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated 
error of counsel, if that error is sufficiently egregious and 
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prejudicial, it must consider the totality of the circumstances in 
making its determination." Strickland, Id. 
It further appears that the attorney's presentation of 
the defense was so detrimental to the Appellant that the trial 
judge did not take seriously anything presented by said attorney, 
Thus, the Appellant was denied effective assistance and prejudice 
is presumed when the trial judge is so hostile to the lawyer as to 
"doom the client to defeat" and deprive the Appellant of his right 
to an impartial tribunal (See Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 
1077 [7th Cir. 1985].) 
It is obvious that counsel was so unfamiliar with the 
case at bar that hew allowed Appellant to prepare and submit his 
own motions to the court. When the trial was in progress, counsel 
seemed so disoriented, as to not know what the judge was saying 
when he asked counsel if he had any further witnesses, eventually 
loosing his right, and it appears from the trial transcript that he 
did not fully comprehend what the court was saying in this regard, 
to examine any further witnesses on Appellant's behalf. 
If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying 
facts of case, including availability of prospective defense 
witnesses, counsel's performance cannot fall within the "wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance." This is because a decision 
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not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision, It is 
only after an adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can make 
a reasonable decision to call or not to call particular witnesses 
for tactical reasons. (See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 [1990] .) 
It appears that, even if counsel had the witnesses 
present, counsel did not fully know and understand the reasons for 
their testimony. This is ineffectiveness. Counsel could not 
communicate intelligently with the Court and, therefore, was in no 
position to ensure that a defense was heard and comprehended by the 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
The State charged Appellant under a provision of its 
nuisance ordinance which only defines what a nuisance is. It does 
not include a penalty clause and therefore should be declared void 
under existing law. 
In so doing the Judge found Appellant guilty of crimes 
for which he was never charged in the information. 
The State fell short of its burden of proof, never 
substantiating any of its claims at trial, never producing any 
expert witnesses, and accepting answers such as "I don't know11 to 
prove Appellant guilty. 
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Appellant's counsel was totally ineffective, being of 
advanced age and unable to hear basic court proceedings. This was 
apparent to the court and easily weakened Appellant's cause. This 
makes it likely, that with competent representation, the outcome at 
trial would have been different. 
Additionally, Judge Backlund refused to allow the defense 
to present any expert witnesses or lay witnesses in its behalf 
saying that no matter how many witnesses you call, the stuff is 
still junk and will always be junk. This violated Appellant's 
right to confrontation and to defend himself. The Judge 
erroneously tipped his hat before the trial was finished and in 
fact, ended the trial before an adequate defense, was possible. 
Due to these factors the above conviction should be 
reversed and case dismissed with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED this )^3^ day of January, 1994. 
30N J? 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
MICHAEL/^. S .THOMPSON ^ 
J
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Michael Thompson, hereby certify that on the /rS.^^^ 
day of January 1994, I did mail by first class mail, postage 
prepaid, a true and exact copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS BRIEF 
to: 
J&£ 
^^8*7) MICHAEVJ.S. THOMPSON 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
MtH^v^frflz, ^ ^ 2Vt&> 
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ATTACHMENTS 
(A) ADDENDUM 
(B) 
(C) 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
8.16.010 SOLID WASTE AND SANITATION Spanish Fork City 
and regulations as may be required by the state or by the 
county. Proof of compliance shall be provided upon 
demand. 
8.16.020. Permit Requirement. 
It shall be unlawful for any solid waste contractor to 
collect, transport or dispose of any solid waste within the 
corporate city limits without first obtaining a valid business 
license. This permit shall not constitute a grant of 
franchise nor shall it confer any vested rights but shall be 
a license to perform the services specified in this chapter 
subject to the restrictions and limitations contained herein. 
The license shall be nontransferable and shall be valid for 
a period of one(l) year. 
Chapter 8.20. Abatement of Weeds, Garbage, and 
Refuse. 
8.20.010. Chapter Purpose. 
8.20.020. Inspector - Office Created. 
8.20.030. Nuisance Abatement. 
8.20.040. Discretion of Inspector. 
8.20.050. Governmental Immunity. 
8.20.010. Chapter Purpose. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to establish a means 
whereby this municipality may remove or abate or cause 
the removal or abatement of injurious and noxious weeds 
and of garbage, refuse or unsightly and deleterious objects 
or structures pursuant to the powers granted to it by 
Chapter 11 of Title 10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, and pursuant to its general power to abate 
nuisances. It is declared that the above listed weeds, 
objects and structures constitute a nuisance when they 
create a fire hazard, a source of contamination, or pollution 
of water, air or property, a danger to health, a breeding 
place of habitation for insects or rodents or other forms of 
life deleterious to human habitations or are unsightly or 
deleterious to their surroundings. 
8.20.020. Inspector - Office Created. 
The office of inspector is created for the purpose of 
administering the provisions of this chapter and the powers 
delegated to this municipality by said statues subject to 
such control and review as the city council may from time 
to time direct. The office of inspector shall be appointed 
by and act under the direction of the public safety director. 
8.20.030. Nuisance Abatement 
The public safety department shall comply in all 
respects with Utah Code Annotated §10-11-1 et seq. in 
abating the nuisances identified in this chapter. 
8.20.040. Discretion of Inspector. 
The city inspector shall be granted the discretion to 
determine whether weeds, garbage or refuse, arc unsightly 
or deleterious objects or whether structures create a fire 
hazard, source of contamination, or pollution of water, air 
or property, a danger to health, a breeding place or 
habitation for insects or rodents or other forms of life 
deleterious to human habitation or are unsightly or 
deleterious to their surroundings. 
8.20.050. Governmental Immunity. 
The department of public safety, the city inspector 
referred to herein, or any city employee working under the 
direction of either the city inspector or the public safety 
department, together with the city shall be immune from 
any liability by reason of the city's removal of any 
nuisances identified herein, after following the procedures 
set forth in Utah Code Annotated §10-11-1 et.seq. (1953 as 
amended). 
Chapter 8.24. Nuisances. 
8.24.010. 
8.24.020. 
8.24.030. 
8.24.040. 
8.24.050. 
Nuisance. 
Definition of Nuisance. 
Duty of Maintenance of Private 
Property. 
Storage of Personal Property. 
Notice. 
8.24.010. Nuisance. 
The city hereby incorporates as though fully set forth 
herein, the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §76-10-801 
et seq. to define, control, eliminate, and set the punishment 
for any nuisance offense occurring within the city. 
8.24.020. Definition of Nuisance. 
Not withstanding any provisions of state law, a 
nuisance is also defined to mean any condition or use of 
premises or of building exteriors which are deleterious or 
injurious, obnoxious or unsightly which include, but is not 
limited to keeping nor depositing on, or scattering over the 
premises; 
a. Lumber, junk, trash, or debris; 
b. Abandoned, discarded, or unused objects or 
equipment such as furniture, stoves, refrigerators, 
freezers, cans, containers, or other items. 
8.24.030. Duty of Maintenance of Private 
Property. 
No person owning, leasing, occupying, or having 
charge of any premises shall maintain or keep any nuisance 
thereon, nor shall any such person keep or maintain such 
premises in a manner causing substantial diminution in the 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
JOHN /J, KE PRO SE 
1875 so. state 
SPANISH FORK UT. 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT 
SPANISH FORK CITY 
PLAINTIFF 
vs 
JOHN BURKE 
ACCUSED 
MOTION TO DISMISS ORDINANCE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Case No. 931000086 
MOTION TO DISMISS ORDINANCE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
COM^S NOW, THE ACCUSED, John Burke hereby moves the 
aoove entitled Court to dismiss all charges againest the 
accused for the following reason. 
(1) The IV amendment whereas the right to effects. 
(2) The V amendment whereas nor be deprived of property. 
(3) Amendment IX whereas certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
Vhercas the accused feels that the ordinance abuses 
his constitutional rights as stated above therefore the 
aoove entitled Court should find the ordinance without 
foundation and illeagal. Whereas there is no probable 
cause and the action against against the accused dismissed. 
dated this 11th day of July ., 1993 
J&M -#W&-3ff * 
/ ji JOHN BURKE p^a c^ 
KTIKICATft OF MAILING 
ie 9 t h aay o f Augi I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t on t h  y t  i  f u s t , 199.% 
I s e n t a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e s a i d mot ion to t h e 
C l e r k Of The Cour t F o r t a C i r c u i t , S p a n i s h Fork D e p a r t m e n t , 
UO Sou th Main , S p a n i s h F o r k , U t a h . 8^660 
(hand delivered) 
^ ^ ^ ' 
John Burke Pro Se 
re: Motion for transcript (tapes) of case no* 931000086 
Defendant: John Burke trial date Julyiy, 1^93 
sentence date August 5, 1993» 
received this 9th day of August, 1^93 
&juk&-J) 
ourt Clork 
CITY-COUNTY 
HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
OF UTAH COUNTY 
589 SOUTH STATE STREET • PROVO, UTAH 84606 PHONE (801) 370-8700 
June 17, 1993 
Mr. John Burke 
1875 South State 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
Dear Mr. Burke: 
At your request I walked through the property of your antique 
business located at 1875 South State in Spanish Fork on June 16, 
1993 at 11:45 A.M. I was asked to determine if there are any 
health hazards on the grounds. 
It is my determination that there were no health hazards posed 
from the antique items in this yard. There is no evidence of 
insect or rodent problems as there are no evident breeding places 
or food sources available. I was aware of a few broken glasses 
that I talked to Mr. Burke about, but saw no other health or safety 
hazards. 
Sincerely, 
Bonnie Snow 
BS/dg 
JOSEPH K. MINER, M.D., M.S.P.H., DIRECTOR 
BOARD OF HFALTH 
DONALD N. WRIGHT, R ^AIRMAN 
MARY ELLEN EDMUNDS. B.S N R I C H * DP * J, O.D.* r.utSLRT A F8AMPTON. M.D. ,M INF LEIFSON, R N., PH.D. 
John Burke 
Pro Se 
1875 South S t a t e 
S p a n i s h Fork, Utah 
Telephone 798-3861 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COUHT, STATE .OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, SPANISH FORK aEPAPTMENT 
) 
SPANISH FORK CITY,
 } MOTION TO DISMISS ALL 
PLAINTIFF > CHAPGMS 
vs > 
JOHM BUPKE \ 
1875 Sou th S t a t e > 
S p a n i s h Fork , UU aO;6<MJ ^ CASK >!0* J.aPMPOwPp 
DIMaMJiEPT N 
MOTION 
COMES NOW t h e defender!!, , Joan Purl-a: hereLy .jav--.; tnie onove 
e n t i t l e d Cour t to d i s m i s s a l l cia: r p o s aL;a'una. the cie l e n d e n t 
v;hereas S p a n i s h Fork C:\iy O r u a a a a c e o . an . una i s n o t a 
v a l i d o r d i n a n c e a s i t a a s n >t p r o p e r l y c o n c e i v e d (no j-rr-a.-iule) 
Utah code Anno t a t cai 1 0 - p~ 70 a 10 aP • 
T h i s mot ion i s based on t h e file.1 , o :.' n.a.. . ' aov - e n t i t l e d Coaia* 
The d e f e n d a n t b e i e i v e e no o ; t e n s e inn; n. — a conal t i e d a s t n o r e 
a a s n o t p r o b a b l e c a u a : a t the t i a e of :• rrera. . . 
Dated t hi s 21 s t d a y o f J u a a, 1 a P a • 
"Jo ha aurMe 
Pro So 
JOHN BURKS Pro Se 
1875 South 'State 
Spanish Fork, Ut. 8^660 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
UTAH COI/NTY, 
) 
SPANISH FORK CITY 
PLAINTIFF 
•:ou vT, S ; ] A T : ; O F UTA: : 
R A R I O ; : :^'<\: o:;.:vrT!M^N^ 
/iDTiOii TO !jfiSMi;::;,i),«:!';i 
, ) y : . . . / ; »i.i\'.»/\ij o y ; ~ > ' 
JOHN BURKE 
ACCUSED 
iO • ; yi.OUUUOo 
MOTION TO DISMloS ORuliJy^Ji'. uy-a<: 07RRLY 0,a)AR 
e n t i t l e d Court to d i smiss a i l eaua::;ea ; 
for the fo l lowing reasons (1) Raraaaa ..a 
y.hat the b e n e f i t s v/ill be lot* ;.n«,- i'•.•;. i.» 
w i l l b e n e f i t ? The r e s i d e n t s cieaaia-.-. a 
remove t h e r e p roper ty or the rc-si a. -a La 
for t i d y p remises , v/nich i s UncunsLi U;: 
u ses the word g e n e r a l l y as to mo esie.,t 
va lues i n tiro c i t y , v/hereas LU•...: ncc ,^ ; 
i s to .broad for i t covers toe i n d u s t r l ; 
a r e a s which have l i k e unt idy p remises . 
be any d iminut ion of t h i s type of ;aa>;a. 
paragraph 2 i s in d i r e c t oon t r au i c t.F>n 
the d imin t ion in toe value of La;; ia.a. ,; 
premises a re l o c a t e d . Thermos the scam 
no d iminut ion in value to neirjno >r i a,; 
L I i ( ' 
'..; 1 :. 
• > r a 
a . •' *{' a 
«.-r e a ; 
1
 T h a t i'( 
a a n - i !.«.. 
Lii(;.; r s 1 
;") P a . r ; . ^ i 
( j u a o i i i. 
a.; f n u r , i 
id Lhi..- iV 
l; in.; n a n s 
; •;.(; t a a L 
a,a a a 
i a ; i U : 
,'i ,.'-\>J rp T M n A *''*' 7 <''V\T ( 0 T ' * ''', " ' • r ! £ > M 
;:.; 
.'.5 I ' : 
, A ^ 
i'i U < 
oa: 
I ; 
c i 
Droae Lne i 
i • . m a c h i n e r y , 
o n , f , l i c , : . . 
.,"• Ltio b r o a d 
; a 1 ;,ii'{j;:; 
re ae cu red 
-.y i s i u vi'j 
now . e x s i t * o n f a l l b o r d e r i n g p r o p e r : i<>s , v / i m a s t h e r e i. 
p r o b a b l e c a u s e . 
Whereas t h e a c c u s e d con. tends t h a t o . : ) r „ eye i 
c o u l d i n c o m p a s s t h e u s e of v/a<yon w h e e i s , u i r 
e c t * e c t * t h a t a r e b e i n g used fo r y.'urj-..ii roc 
a l l r e s i d e n t s cou ld be f o r c e d to r e . ; vo : , .iu; 
c o n c e p t of t h i s p o r t i o n of tiio o r d i n a n c e . VI. 
p e r c e n t a g e of t h e c i t y i s m v i o l a t i o n .-.uer-
c o n t e n d s t h e r e can bo no c a u s e If a o e t -\ u, 
o r t h e \ o r d i n a n c e i s to p o o r l y c o n c e i v-;w. 
'Yhereas ' t h e a c c u s e d moves trie aeuve i n i : O..UJ Cour t to fin-
o r d i n a n c e to b road and c o n f u s i n g to u< M;.' I •:• ui.0n sl.nnda. 
r e q u i r e d f o r a . l e y a i document in th--- <. u - i - . , o iuyni . i;,;.;U', 
o f o u r Utah Court*; . 
I ' /hereas t h e a c c u s e d be l i eve r s t h e o i r ; r r ; . . ^ r : OJ o- ivi. t ho rn i 
n u t c o n c e i v e d p r o p e r l y i l l e y o l -tun \o ry UUCJUUL i Lu t i ona.L. 
' h e r e a s t h e r e i s no c a u s e . 
Da ted t h i s Zpth day of J n o r , J /..;••. 
Slu h i i ''Ui'O •. I l u On 
John Burke Pro Ce 
1 8 7 / Sou th S t a t e 
S p a n i s h Fork C i t y 
T e l e p h o n e : 79C-;>oui 
invi< •' 1 ] ' y v 'a - I , : ' '] ' 
SPANISH FORK CT'L'Y 
.AT. NT I. ?': 
JOHN BUttKM 
ACCUSED 
avi 
10* 
MOYION ".\> i;is • A C ^ 0 ' ' i 
COMES NOV/, THK oai- i:;:;Ji':\T, John ^ u n -
e n t i t l e d Cour t to d i a r i e s oL.L :'Ji:i:";;^,; 
fo r t n e fo l lowing : r e a s o n s viN Ln^ ca... 
i s s c a t t e r e d abou t t h e p r o ; j v r t y aad I 
v a l u e . The d e f e n d a n t ra.:Duta Uiii ; a l i a 
o i d a n t i q u e s , co l ! cc t i L;1OC, a:a; a r t l c 
of numerous a r t o.-rrruo, ioc :^ tec ai-au-
c l a i m s a mone ta ry / a i u e to a i l a e t a t a 
'Ciereas t n e defensor:-, conienuc. . a c t a 
e x s i s t e d , a s p e r S a a n i s h F a n ; C i t y a-
whereas , a l l c h a r g e s anou ld JO u L a a l ^ a 
a c t 
, . ! ' i 
.'.u "i ! ' : "J 
Dated ten a a .. i L»u / 
Jo\i]fi 'O.J r ' i . a 
> ft \a 
John Burke Pro Se 
187i?South S t a t e 
S p a n i s h F o r k , UT. dkboO 
701)-in CIddUIT COUhT, I, ATI, OP UTAH 
UTAH COlJNfY, SPA .13H FQrtK FEPAHTMENT 
) 
SPANISH FORK CITY j MOTION TO DISMISS C_Jv rPS 
PLAINTIFF s PLAINTIFF ENCEDIKG POWEh OF 
V8 A ORDINANCE. 
JOHN BURKE 
ACCUSED 
) 
) 
^ Case No, 931OOOObe 
^ 
MOTION: PLAT?; PI i'F 'PPPPTTFT 
COMFS NOV/ tuo a c c u s e d , John Burno in-reny moves t h e above 
e n t i t l e d Cour t to d i s m i s s a i i c u a r ^ j s a g a i n s t t e e a c c u s c a no Uic 
P l a i n t i f f demands more Irian the o r d i n a n c e ( a s w r i t t e n ) n - q u i r e r . 
Whereas 8 . 2 ^ . 0 ^ 0 s p o c i f i c l y u s e s tiie v/ora, u n s h e i t e r e d , 
whereas t h e a c c u s e d c o n t e n d s t h i s C O J P J faea.ii a s i g h t s h i e l d i n g 
c a r r i e r o r more commonly known a s L>- fence made of v/ood, o r m e t a l 
o r any n o n - s e e - t h r o u g h - m a t e r i a l • As i s acceded b.y both f e d e r a l 
and s t a t e s t a n d a r d s fo r c o n c e l i i ' s au to s a l v ^ j e y a r d s . 
' J h o r e a s t h e a c c u s e d s u b m i t s to t h e h o n o r a u l e Cour t for 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of a s t i e l t o r . 
S n e l t e r ( c o n n e c t e d -vith sn ie icP ' to p r e f e c t o r as a. s h i e l d 
p r o t e c t o r de fend from u a n ^ e r , d i s t r e s s , a n n o y a n c e , o r t h e 
l i k e , a l s o to ward o f f , a l s o to a v e r t , p r e v e n t , o r f o r b i d -
Whereas t h e a c c u s e d e e l i e v e s f h a t t he p l a i n t i f f s o n l y 
c l a i m of a n u i s a n c e i s one of s i ^ n t and a v.ood f ence v:ould 
and c o u l d be a rermedy fo r the word s h e l t e r . 
FOURTH .CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTM 
SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT 
SPANISH FORK CITY 
VS 
JOHN BURKE 
Plaintiff I 
Defendant ) 
S U M M O N S 
CASE NO. 901000870 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT (S): 
An Information has been filed with the above Court by: 
alleging that you committed the public offense of: ZONING VIOLATION 
a t ; SPANISH FORK CITY 
o n : OCTOBER 1, 1990 
in violation of: 17.88.010 
It appears frcm said Information (or an affidavit filed therewith) that 
there is probable cause to believe that the alleged offense has been committed 
and that you committed the same. Therefore: 
YOU ABE HEEESY SUMMONED to appear before a Judge of the Circuit Court at 
the time and place shewn below: 
DATS: October 30, 1990 TIME: 10:00 A.M. 
PLACE: Spanish Fork Circuit Court, 40 South Main Street. Spanish Fork, UT 
to answer the charge made against you. If you fail to obey this Summons, or 
contact the Clerk of the Court (Telephone 798-3674) and arrange for your appearanc 
on another date, the Court will issue a Warrant for your arrest. 
DATED: 10-10-90 
U CIRCUIT JUDGE 
TAYLOR & TAYLOR 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
2 7 5 NORTH MAIN STREET 
P O BOX 2 8 8 
S P A N I S H F O R K , U T A H 8 4 6 0 O - O 2 8 8 
(801) 7 0 8 - 3 5 7 4 
RICHARD M TAYLOR 
S JUNIOR BAKER 
BRET B HICKEN 
November 13f 1989 
Mr. John Burke 
7923 South State 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
Re: Violation of Spanish Fork City Zoning Ordinance 
Dear Mr. Burke: 
It has come to my attention that your business operation at 
7923 South State is in violation of the Spanish Fork City Zoning 
Ordinance. 
I have been made aware that second hand merchandise sales 
are being conducted out of doors. The zoning ordinance requires 
that second hand sales of merchandise be conducted indoors only. 
I have been informed that you have been notified of this 
violation by the City Building Inspector, that more than thirty 
(30) days have elapsed, and that the violation continues. 
The City fully intends to enforce its zoning ordinance. If 
this violation is not corrected within two (2) weeks from the 
date of this letter, the City will pursue its legal avenues to 
enforce its ordinance. These efforts may include taking steps to 
revoke your business license. 
While the City wishes you well in your business endeavors, 
your business, like all others, must comply with the zoning 
requirements. 
Sincerely, 
TAYLOR & TAYLOR 
SJB/jjb 
cc: Mr. Paul Larsen, 
City Building Inspector 
TAYLOR, B A K E R & H I C K E N 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
275 NORTH MAIN STREET 
P. O. BOX 288 
S P A N I S H FORK, UTAH 8 4 6 6 0 - 0 2 8 8 
(801) 798-3574 
RICHARD M. TAYLOR FORMERLY TAYLOR & TAYLOR 
S. JUNIOR BAKER 
BRET B. HICKEN 
August 17, 1990 
Mr. John Burke 
Rt. 1 Box 419 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Dear Mr. Burke: 
It has been drawn to my attention that you are not obtaining 
the identification and thumb prints of persons with whom you are 
doing business at your establishment. This is in violation of 
Spanish Fork City Ordinances Chapter 5.28. This ordinance 
essentially adopts the provisions of- Utah Code Annotated Section 
76-6-408. 
You should be aware that strict compliance with this act is 
required. Your failure to so comply constitutes criminal conduct 
under both City and State law. Demand is made that you act in 
conformance with the requirements of the law in order to avoid 
criminal charges being filed. If you insist on noncompliance, 
the City will have no alternative but to file criminal charges 
against you. 
I have also noticed that you have built a chain link fence 
along your front storage area. I remind you that you are located 
in a commercial district 2(C~2) zone which permits antiques and 
second hand merchandise sales. However, the ordinance permits 
those activities indoors only. Thus, by fencing your yard, you 
have failed to come into compliance with the zoning ordinance. 
As you will recall when we met earlier in the year, you had 
agreed to be in compliance with the zoning ordinance by June of 
this year. The City, therefore, makes demand upon you that you 
come in to immediate compliance with the zoning requirements of a 
C-2 zone. 
I have enclosed for your review the use regulations of the 
C-2 zone as contained in the Spanish Fork City Ordinances 
17.48.020. I have also enclosed for your review the City 
Ordinances 5.28, which deal with second hand merchandise and 
antique dealers and their requirement to obtain identification 
S. JUNIOR BAKER 0182 
TAYLOR, BAKER & HICKEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
275 North Main 
P.O. Box 288 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660-0288 
(208) 798-3574 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH, SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT 
SPANISH FORK CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN BURKE, aka HUGH MENDELKOV, 
Rt. 1 Box 419 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
D. O. B. unknown/adult 
Defendant. 
BILL OF PARTICULARS 
Criminal No. 901000 
COMES NOW S. Junior Baker, attorney for the Plaintiff, who, 
upon information and belief, states that the Information filed in 
this matter is based upon the following alleged facts: 
Spanish Fork City Ordinance 5.28.010 regulates the operation 
of "Secondhand Dealers". Section 5.28.030 specifically states 
that: "Display of merchandise -- all merchandise displayed by a 
secondhand, junk or antique dealer to be held for sale by such 
dealer shall be held and displayed within an enclosed structure." 
A violation of the above ordinance is deemed to be a Class C 
Misdemeanor. 
Spanish Fork City Ordinance 5.28.040 and 5.28.070 require that 
all dealers keep complete and written records of every transaction 
- 1 -
in the business and outlines the information and format required. 
5.28.070 also requires a secondhand dealer to verify identification 
from all individuals involved in transactions with the dealer. A 
violation of these ordinances constitutes a Class B Misdemeanor. 
All of the above-mentioned ordinances were in effect on May 9, 
1991. On that date, two Spanish Fork police officers entered the 
Defendant's premises with a 20f blue and black Diamondback boyfs 
bicycle. 
The police officers state that the Defendant offered to 
purchase the bicycle for the sum of three dollars ($3.00). The 
officer agreed and was paid $3.00 by the Defendant and the 
Defendant was given the bicycle. At no time did the Defendant 
request identification, or, to the officers1 knowledge, initiate 
any paperwork on the transaction. 
On May 10, 1991, a Spanish Fork police detective entered the 
Defendant's business and observed the bicycle parked in front of 
the business building. The detective requested paperwork related 
to the transaction for the Defendant, and was informed that the 
Defendant, upon advise from his legal counsel, did not utilize any 
paperwork or request identification. The officer took possession 
of the bicycle in question, and also is holding the three $1.00 
bills received as payment from the Defendant. 
Both police officers have identified the Defendant as the 
individual involved in the transaction. 
Based upon the report of the police officers involved, the 
Defendant is charged by the City of Spanish Fork with a violation 
- 2 -
of Spanish Fork Municipal Ordinance 17.88.010, a Class C 
Misdemeanor, and violation of Spanish Fork Municipal Code 5.28.040 
and 5.28.070, which are Class B Misdemeanors. Copies of the 
applicable ordinances are attached hereto. 
DATED this ^ 0 day of y^n f^ , 1991. 
S. JUNIOR BAKER 
- 3 -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Bill of Particulars, postage prepaid, to Mr. 
Paul J. Merrill, 166 North Main, P.O. Box 29, Spanish Fork, UT 
84660 this p(y day of August, 1991. 
Secretary 
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FOURTH :iAih OF mm 
SPANISH FORK DEPARIMT 
SPANISH FORK CITY 
VS 
NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE 
901000870 
^ S E N 0. 
Detendari t 
JOHN BURtvJi 
At the request oi-
ls continued to TUESI;.-. 
at 10:0u _ 
setting is vacated. 
THE DEFENDANT 
NOVEMBER 27 
f this matter 
'.19 9° 
o ' c l o c k '•> « . « - MXAICKMaiT and the prior 
;ertiiy that- true copies of the foregoing Notice of Continuance were mailedf 
postage prepaid, on this day of November L9 90 to the 
following interested parties, at the addresses indicated, to-wit: 
Junior Baker, Atty. for Plaintiff - Hand Delivered 
John Burke, RT 1 Box 419, Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, SPANIS FORK DEPARTMENT 
SPAN J 
] ' i 11 H I . i r j , 
vs 
JOHN BURKE, 
RT. 1, BOX 419 
SPANISH FORK, UT 84660 
NO'i x v. i:. .. r CONTI NUANCE 
Case No. 901000870 
Defenuoj. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that at the request ol (he City the 
Arraignment scheduled in this case for November 2\ n 11• i:. now been 
continued to December 27, 1990 at 10:00 A.M. 
OFFENSES: ZONING VIOLATION 
Da11M) t,In i s iBLli day of November, i ^ ^ o , 
Connie Swain, Clerk 
I c e rt i£y that t ruc , opi e 
were mailed postage prepaid, 
following interested pa~*-; 
'K I^I-W^W^. . »Ov,i^c ui continuance 
-, 28th day of November, 1990 to the 
- addresses indicated, to-wit: 
Junior otkei , Attorney *or F;ainiiff, h 
Dm -. endan!-:, a-: tnt above address 
j n u \\K- .red 
Connie Sw a in, C1erk 
T - - H*, B A K E R & H I C K E N 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
2 7 5 NORTH MAIN STREET 
P. O. BOX 2 8 8 
S P A N I S H . FORK, U T A H 8 4 6 6 0 - 0 2 8 8 
C801) 7 9 8 - 3 5 7 4 
RICHARD M. TAYLOR FORMERLY TAYLOR 8e TAYLOR 
S. JUNIOR BAKER 
BRET B. HICKEN 
Septembei I " I '" " i 0 
Mr " Burke 
Rt 1 Box 419 
Spanish Fork I T Olftf.O 
informed by :;.\ , rf. ice that you, have 
mac. .nquiry as to the procedure :c de-annex from the 
cit^ I have enclosed for your benefit the provisions 
from the Utah Code that deal w-i-v. such matters. 
-~ -:._ . . w..«: .-L v :idi instructed me to file 
suit against . i ;• your zoning violations. This will 
be filed within the next few day;- ". i may avoid that-
process by coming in* ~-^" N -: • as my earlier 
correspondence indicates 
Sincerely, 
TAYLOR, BAKER & HICKEN 
S, Junior Baker 
Ijipaiu ,sh Fork City Attorney 
SJB/jjb 
End osure 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SPANISH FORK D E P O T E i T 
S P M I S H F 0 R K C I T Y 
vs 
PlcLLUt Li 
j NOTICE OF SETT'ING 
CASE NO, 911000436 
Defendant 
JOHN" BURKE 
You A R E HEEEBY NOTIFIED tha I: the abc* re clesigi lated ca sc= i s set for: 
SENTENCING 
TUESDAY OCTOBER 22 19 91 at 10:00 
o'clock ^  M. in 'the Courtroom, of tK/3 aV>ove Coi u: t:i( 40 South Main Street 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
>>7j /L'LcJ fit <n,yu 
v Deputy Clerk 
I certify 'that 'true copies of 'the foregoing Notice of Setting were mailed, 
postage, prepaid, on this 15 day of October „ 19 91 , 
to the following interested parties: ~ — —" 
Junior Baker, Atty. for Plaintiff - Hand Delivered 
Paul Merrill, Atty. for Defendant, P.O.. Box 29, Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
) W n 
PAUL J . ^RRILL US3 #??U3 
At torney for defendant 
166 North "ain 
P . O . box ?9 
Spanish Fork, Utah BU6fO 
Telephone: 798-3293 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SPANISH FORK DEPART* TN? 
SPANISH YCP.Y. Ci?Y, 
P l a - n t i f f , 
vs 
J^HN EURKE aka H!Tr,F F . ENDELKOW, 
Defendant. 
GEBERAL APPEARANCE PY ATTORNEY 
FLEA OF W? GUILTY 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Civil No. 
I hereby cert' fy that T have been retained by the sa^ 'd, John 
Purke aka Hugh F. Trendelkow, to represent the defendant ^n the above 
entitled case. I hereby certify that I a^ a member in good standing with 
the Utah State r?ar having Number ?2h3 • I hereby make a general appearance 
^n the above entitled case and I agree to ha rile the case at every stage 
of the proceedings w~th due diligence. 
That John Purke aka Hugh F. ^ endelkow by and through is attorney, 
Paul J. rerrill enters a plea of not guilty to the following charges 
of zoning violating a class C mis. & Failure to T^mrlete Written Rrcords, 
a Class P., TTis> 
The sa^ 'd defendant, John Purke aka Hugh F. ^ endelkow, bv and through 
Mr attorney, Paul J. ^ erri'll, demands a .jury tr^a]. 
^ated June f, ]Q91. J? />/]/) V / 
PAUL J. WERRTLL. 
Attorney for Defendant 
PAGE -?-
FILING CERTTFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of June, 1991* I sent a 
true and correct cory of the attached general appearance by attorney, 
plear of not guilty and demand for jury trial to the Spanish Fork City 
attorney, S. Junior Baker % Taylor, Baker and Hicken, at his office 
at 275 North vain, postage pre-paid. 
Attorney Tor Befendarit 
